The Benefits of Equity in the Constitutional Quest for Equality by Codrington, Wilfred, III
Brooklyn Law School 
BrooklynWorks 
Faculty Scholarship 
6-2019 
The Benefits of Equity in the Constitutional Quest for Equality 
Wilfred Codrington III 
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/faculty 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons 
  105 
THE BENEFITS OF EQUITY IN THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL QUEST FOR EQUALITY 
 
BY WILFRED U. CODRINGTON III∞ 
 
Recent high-profile scandals have prompted a national conversation about 
male privilege, gender-based disparities, and sexual violence in the United States. 
Relatedly, within an 18-month period, two states ratified the Equal Rights 
Amendment, proposed by Congress in 1972, thereby reviving the chances of 
securing a constitutional guarantee of gender equality.1 Unlike the broader national 
conversation, however, the renewed debate over the ERA has been fairly limited, 
mainly focused on two types of questions. On one hand, there are questions about 
the ratification process, in particular, the merits of picking up where the initial 
campaign left off—the “three-state strategy”—versus beginning anew with the 
“fresh start” approach.2 On the other, advocates and opponents have sparred over 
whether, given the progress over the last 50 years, the U.S. Constitution needs an 
ERA.3 To be sure, these are valid concerns that demand resolution. The process 
issue, likely a political question, merits consideration because it implicates not just 
the ERA, but future battles in amendment politics and even democratic legitimacy. 
The substantive concern, whether there is a present need for an ERA, is 
fundamentally a question about our values, and addressing it properly requires deep 
reflection about the type of nation we have been, are, and aspire to be. 
Yet, these are not the only issues raised by the prospect of an ERA. Instead, 
the greatest ERA-related “controversy” may be the narrowness of the debate and the 
important questions left out of it. For example, is the ERA sufficient to meet today’s 
gender discrimination challenges? And if not, what else could help? Drawing on the 
development of American law and history, I conclude that the answer to the first 
                                                             
∞ Wilfred U. Codrington III is the Bernard and Anne Spitzer Fellow at the Brennan Center for Justice 
at NYU School of Law, where he focuses on democracy, constitutional reform, and the rule of law. 
1 See Bill Chappell, One More to Go: Illinois Ratifies Equal Rights Amendment, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 
2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/05/31/615832255/one-more-to-go-illinois-
ratifies-equal-rights-amendment [https://perma.cc/R7GK-BDUU] (discussing Illinois’ ratification of 
the ERA in 2018, which followed Nevada’s ratification of the ERA in 2017).  
2 Compare Vikram David Amar, What Legal Effect, If Any, Can Recent State Ratifications (Including 
Illinois’s Earlier this Summer) of the Equal Rights Amendment Have, JUSTIA: VERDICT (Sept. 21, 2018), 
https://verdict.justia.com/2018/09/21/what-legal-effect-if-any-can-recent-state-ratifications-
including-illinoiss-earlier-this-summer-of-the-equal-rights-amendment-have [https://perma.cc/6Q2N-
2FS3] (explaining lawmakers would have to restart the process to pass an ERA, because extending the 
lapsed ratification deadline “would be problematic.”), with Allison L. Held, Sheryl L. Herndon & 
Danielle M. Stager, The Equal Rights Amendment: Why the ERA Remains Legally Viable and Properly 
Before the States, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 113, 135 (1997) (If Congress reviews and votes to 
repeal the ratification deadline, which “is not part of the amendment,” state legislatures can restart the 
ratification process where it left off.). 
3 Compare, e.g., JESSICA NEUWIRTH, EQUAL MEANS EQUAL: WHY THE TIME FOR AN EQUAL RIGHTS 
AMENDMENT IS NOW (2015) (making the case for the ERA through a range of gender discrimination 
cases), with Susan Estrich, Politics and the Limits of Law: A Musing for Dean Sullivan, 90 CAL. L. 
REV. 813, 813 (2002) (“Phyllis Schlafly was right, ironically enough. We didn’t need an Equal Rights 
Amendment. We got one, virtually identical to the one we proposed, through the decisions of the U.S. 
Supreme Court.”). 
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question is “no,” and to the second, “equity.” Due to the differences between legal 
equality and equity, parties might invoke an Equal Rights Amendment in certain 
cases but remain aggrieved, whereas equity might result in a more just remedy. 
Defining equality and equity—the two concepts at the core of my thesis—
is a difficult task, but a common understanding of them is essential to the argument. 
Equality refers to “[t]he quality, state, or condition of being equal” or “likeness in 
power or political status.”4 Our conception of legal equality is often crammed into a 
bipartite paradigm, with one component considering access or opportunity (more or 
less procedural equality), and the other concerned with results or outcome (more or 
less substantive equality). Equity, in contrast, entails a “recourse to principles of 
justice to correct or supplement the law as applied to particular circumstances,” 
enabling judges to “prevent[ ] hardship that would otherwise ensue from the literal 
interpretation of a legal instrument [in] . . . extreme case[s] or from the literal 
exclusion of a case that seems to fall within what the drafters of the instrument 
probably intended.”5 If equality’s function is bivariate, equity’s is multivariate. 
Notably, “[e]quity can perform three functions—it can be used to adapt the law to 
the facts of individual cases (equity infra legem); it can be used to fill gaps in the 
law (equity praeter legem); and it can be used as a reason for refusing to apply unjust 
laws (equity contra legem).”6 Translated literally, equity can be applied under, 
besides, or against the law, regardless of whether the dispute relates to process or 
substance. This key feature distinguishes equity from the more polarized equality. 
Yet the effects of using both in an analysis are cumulative; when applied together, 
they can address a broader spectrum of anti-discrimination cases, and with greater 
nuance. This relative continuity permits a more robust, intersectional analysis than 
what is possible under the legal equality paradigm alone. 
Two things are important to note up front for this discussion. First, the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection doctrine is the principal model for the 
U.S. anti-discrimination or legal equality framework. Many scholars believe that an 
equal rights analysis would mirror the current equal protection analysis,7 but the 
precise doctrinal implications of an ERA (i.e. whether ratifying it would lead to 
gender discrimination claims being subject to “strict scrutiny” rather than the current 
                                                             
4 Equality, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
5 Equity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). See also Howard L. Oleck, Historical Nature of 
Equity Jurisprudence, 20 FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 24 (1951) (“Equity is that portion of the law which 
was developed . . . to remedy defects in the common law” and “more important, . . . enunciated for the 
purpose of meliorating any harsh or otherwise undesirable effects resulting from the strict application 
of any particular rule of law.”). 
6 Michael Akehurst, Equity and General Principles of Law, 25 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 801, 801 (1976). 
7 See, e.g., Barbara A. Brown, Thomas I. Emerson, Gail Falk & Ann E. Freedman, The Equal Rights 
Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 892 (1971) 
(Because “[t]he process by which [the courts and Congress] make that judgment [of whether 
differential treatment is justified] involves the same discretionary weighing of preferences as has 
resulted in the present inequality[,] . . . [t]here is no reason to believe that such a decision-making 
apparatus will end up in a substantially different position from what we have now.”); Wilfred R. Caron, 
The Equal Rights Amendment: A Legal Assessment, 30 CATHOLIC LAWYER 301, 305–07 (1985) 
(discussing a model for legal analysis under the ERA in light of “equal protection precedents”). 
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“heightened review” standard) is subject to debate.8 I argue that courts have 
authority to invoke principles of equity, and should do so to augment the legal 
equality analysis in anti-discrimination law. 
Second, this is neither an argument against using the legal equality 
framework nor against the Equal Rights Amendment. Equality under the law is a 
laudable goal for society, and our equal protection doctrine has advanced the rights 
of women and minorities, vastly improving American society. The U.S. would 
likewise be better-served with an equal rights doctrine rooted in an explicit, 
permanent constitutional provision outlawing gender-based discrimination. Still, our 
legal equality framework has critical shortcomings that have sometimes resulted in 
courts reaching the wrong outcome in discrimination cases. Adding an equity-based 
analysis to the existing legal equality framework could empower courts to provide 
appropriate relief. I conclude with an example to briefly demonstrate that equity can 
enhance courts’ analysis and potentially would have altered the outcome in the 2007 
gender discrimination case Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.9 
 
*** 
 
Beyond its potential to address a wider array of discrimination cases, equity 
has at least three other traits that make it well-suited for use in U.S. courts. For one, 
it is a familiar concept in American society, and the U.S. legal system contemplates 
its use. Also, liberty, which is arguably the most entrenched principle underlying our 
legal system, works more seamlessly with equity than equality. And finally, equity 
can be employed within the broader framework of U.S. law to enhance the pursuit 
of equality. 
First, Americans are well acquainted with the notion of equity, and judges 
presiding over cases are already authorized to invoke it. Not only is it a fixture in 
our Constitution, which extends “judicial power . . . to all cases, in law and equity,”10 
                                                             
8 Compare, e.g., Martha F. Davis, The Equal Rights Amendment: Then and Now, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER 
& L. 419, 422 (2008) (“By adding a specific reference to sex equality to the Constitution, the 
amendment would result in strict scrutiny for governmental policies that discriminate based on sex and 
lead to a greater consideration of the particular impact of decisions on women even in the private 
sector.”), with Lisa Baldez, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Does the U.S. Constitution Need an 
Equal Rights Amendment?, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 243, 250 (2006) (“One set [of commentators], for 
example, asserts that the amendment’s presence would not necessarily ensure adoption of strict scrutiny 
and that its absence does not automatically negate it.”). Whether the Equal Rights Amendment would 
raise the standard of review or maintain the current level of scrutiny, a firm constitutional hook to 
establish clarity on this point is a legitimate reason to support its ratification. 
9 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, Lily Ledbetter 
Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009). 
10 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (emphasis added). See also U.S. CONST. amend. XI (stripping federal courts 
of jurisdiction over “suit[s] in law or equity . . . against one of the United States by Citizens of another 
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”). Cf. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The 
President . . . shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, 
except in cases of impeachment.”). The pardon power may be thought of as an executive tool for 
providing equitable relief in extraordinary cases that lead to unjust outcomes. See, e.g., Harold J. Krent, 
Conditioning the President’s Conditional Pardon Power, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1665, 1674 n.48 (2001) 
(comparing Alexander Hamilton’s argument for presidential pardon power to Aristotle’s argument for 
“equity to temper the inevitable imprecision of rules.”); James D. Barnett, The Grounds of Pardon, 17 
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but its justification has remained constant: equity empowers courts “to give relief in 
extraordinary cases, which are exceptions to [the] general rules.”11 Two centuries 
later, equity remains a mainstay in American legal and political culture. Because 
equity falls squarely within the courts’ competencies, invoking it can nudge society 
forward without introducing wholly novel concepts that might upend the 
administration of justice.12 
Equality, however, demands some measure of social upheaval,13 
“evolution,”14—or even a revolution15—in the legal system to account for the scope 
of “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities,” particularly in a society as 
diverse as ours.16 Whereas “legal equality comes only when the ground has been 
prepared by social and political movements,”17 no groundswell of energy by 
marginalized groups (and their allies) or other major societal shift is required for 
equity to prevail. In this sense, equity is less foreign to the American justice system 
than equality. 
Second, there is inherent tension between liberty and equality. The problem, 
put simply, is that one person’s exercise of unfettered freedom can encroach on 
another’s legitimate expectation of equal treatment, and vice versa. For example, 
underlying the Supreme Court’s ruling that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits 
racially-restrictive housing covenants is the principle that society’s collective 
interest in racial equality may trump an individual’s liberty to contract.18 In the 
crudest sense, the relationship between the two can be conceived of as a zero-sum 
game, where transactions result in winners and losers.19 This framing, liberty versus 
                                                             
AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 490, 508 (1927) (“The pardoning power . . . answers about the 
same purposes in the administration of criminal matters that equity does in the administration of civil 
matters. Equity supplies that wherein the [civil] law by reason of its universality is deficient; and 
pardons supply that wherein the criminal law by reason of its universality is deficient.”). 
11 THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton). 
12 Contra Alda Facio & Martha I. Morgan, Equity or Equality for Women? Understanding CEDAW’s 
Equality Principles, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1133, 1156 (2009) (arguing for “equality,” not “equity,” in the 
global fight against gender discrimination because the latter is “not guaranteed in any legal document” 
in the international human rights framework). Notably, the United States is a signatory to CEDAW, 
but the Senate has not ratified it, and U.S. courts “have been reluctant to accord even persuasive 
interpretive weight to international or comparative law sources.” Id. at 1167. 
13 See Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the 
Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 968–76 (2002). The author explains that “[f]rom the moment” female 
abolitionists learned “that early drafts of the Fourteenth Amendment’s second section referred to ‘male’ 
suffrage, the woman’s rights movement began a campaign for the enfranchisement of women . . . that 
did not abate until ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment over a half century later.” Id. at 968–69.  
14 See, e.g., Colin Daileda, A Short History of Obama’s Evolving Stance on Gay Marriage, MASHABLE 
(Apr. 16, 2014), https://mashable.com/2014/04/16/history-obama-gay-marriage/#Bj1NxEmHmuqZ 
[https://perma.cc/B3XW-8N35]. 
15 See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION 354–59 (2005) (discussing the path to abolition 
from Civil War to the Thirteenth Amendment). 
16 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
17 Michael C. Dorf, The Paths to Legal Equality: A Reply to Dean Sullivan, 90 CAL. L. REV. 791, 794 
(2002). 
18 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
19 See, e.g., Timothy Zick, The Dynamic Relationship Between Freedom of Speech and Equality, 12 
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL. 13 (2016). Comparing the liberty-equality dynamic in the Civil Rights 
era and the modern gay rights movement, Zick explains that “[t]he right to dissent entails the right to 
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equality, undergirds a long-running philosophical debate, and the search for an 
equilibrium continues to shape our political and legal system. 
It is an open question whether the American system has achieved—or can 
ever achieve—the correct balance between liberty and equality. The Declaration of 
Independence elided over the tension by simply proclaiming the “self-evident” truth 
“that all men are created equal,” specifically with respect to their endowment of 
liberty.20 But the statement fell short in theory by proclaiming fundamental rights 
without explaining which prevails when the two are at odds (or even prioritizing the 
liberty rights of equal citizens). The shortcomings of the pronouncement were even 
more glaring in practice. The statement’s flagrant omission of women, half of the 
nation’s population, is emblematic of the country’s approach to legal equality over 
the course of American history, exposing its comfort with the political and economic 
interests of a few grossly outweighing even the vast majority’s basic right to be 
treated with human dignity. To this end, liberty has been given primacy over equality 
in U.S. law. 
Liberty and equity, however, are not necessarily at loggerheads because, 
under an equity frame, the focus is not the parties’ competing interests. To be sure, 
equity accounts for inherent self-interest and acknowledges that individuals want to 
both be free to act as they see fit and respected as peers within the social order. But 
in doing justice, equity need not consider that tension. Instead, it can focus on the 
entirety of a transaction to resolve what is actually due given the mere fact that 
parties have decided to establish a relationship. This is because equality’s underlying 
assumptions are different than equity’s. Whereas the argument for equality 
presupposes the existence of a non-trivial amount of parity among the parties, equity 
need only assume the bare minimum: that parties freely enter into a relationship in 
which each has some stake or share, agreeing—either explicitly or implicitly—to 
fair and just treatment throughout if only because they commonly have some interest 
in establishing that relationship. Appealing to equity, then, can be understood as 
advancing the cause of liberty because even the most egocentric among us can 
appreciate the idea that discrete, self-interested relationships are best sustained 
through fairness. Equity can encourage the very transactions that produce beneficial 
relationships because parties will enter into them knowing that when unique disputes 
arise, their own interest in seeing that justice is vindicated will be honored. Thus 
conceived, liberty and equity can co-exist more seamlessly and, to some degree, are 
mutually reinforcing. 
Finally, there is the matter of how legal equality has been manifested in 
American law. Our experience with the Fourteenth Amendment makes clear that 
courts have not always been receptive to the cause of equality. Indeed, when equality 
has been at stake, the Supreme Court has often led from behind—trailing the work 
of its co-equal branches and society generally. So even if the country ratifies the 
Equal Rights Amendment, it is not clear that courts would enforce it robustly. 
Consider, for example, the Slaughter-House Cases, which the Supreme 
Court used as an opportunity to dull the Fourteenth Amendment’s edges a mere four 
                                                             
reject the dignity of others, to deny their entitlement to equality, and to exclude them from some of the 
benefits of civil society.” Id. at 63.  
20 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 THE BENEFITS OF EQUITY Vol. 43 
 
110 
years after it was ratified.21 The Court read the amendment to make a “distinction 
between citizenship of the United States and citizenship of a State,”22 holding that 
only the privileges and immunities of “the former [ ] are placed . . . under protection 
of the Federal Constitution, and that the latter . . . are not intended to have any 
additional protection . . . .”23 In this case, which was entirely unrelated to the type of 
legal equality contemplated by the Fourteenth Amendment’s drafters, the Court 
excised any number of civil rights from the Constitution’s purview. Women felt the 
impact of the ruling just two years later when the Court reiterated that “[t]he 
amendment . . . simply furnished an additional guaranty for” those privileges and 
immunities already granted by the states, and rejected the underlying discrimination 
claim to deny them equal rights to suffrage.24 
Within a decade, the Court curtailed the amendment’s scope even further in 
the Civil Rights Cases by establishing the “state action” doctrine, which stymied 
enforcement of legal equality against non-government actors.25 According to the 
Court, it would be “absurd to affirm that, because the rights of life, liberty and 
property . . . are by the amendment . . . protected against invasion on the part of the 
State without due process of law,” and because “the denial by a State to any persons, 
of equal protection of the laws, is prohibited,” Congress has legislative power to 
protect and vindicate the same.26 Of course, after facing decades of mounting social 
pressure, the Court ultimately began to give “full[er] effect . . . to the intent with 
which” the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.27 But even that was short-lived. 
Less than 25 years after the Supreme Court had “dusted off” the Equal Protection 
Clause to hold that de jure segregation in education was unconstitutional,28 the same 
provision was weaponized against its intended beneficiaries—despite the existence 
of pervasive de facto segregation in schools—to sustain legal claims of “reverse 
discrimination.”29 
These cases demonstrate that the legal equality framework is no silver 
bullet, and can even be manipulated to produce unintended consequences. One 
cannot underestimate the ingenuity of a court that is hostile to legal change, or the 
intensity of the forces motivating it to circumvent the law’s true intentions. Even as 
the Court’s reluctance to apply anti-discrimination principles cautions against an 
over-reliance on the judiciary to protect rights, equity provides courts with a greater 
ability to “establish justice.”30 Equity is a tool to supplement—not supplant—the 
current anti-discrimination analysis in the constitutional quest for equality. 
 
                                                             
21 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873). 
22 Id. at 73. 
23 Id. at 74. 
24 Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 171 (1875). 
25 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). 
26 Id. at 13. 
27 Id. at 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
28 Compare Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908) (upholding states’ power to prohibit 
integrated schools), with Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that segregation 
in schools inherently results in a denial of equal protection). 
29 See, e.g., Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
30 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
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*** 
 
This leads to the strongest argument against the use of equity principles in 
this context: the concept is too subjective and would afford judges too much 
discretion. Whereas there is already a strict legal equality doctrine to resolve 
discrimination claims, equity’s framework is mushy and amorphous. A creative 
judge could parse the facts of any case to make it a candidate for equitable resolution, 
arguing that equity, like “hard-core pornography,” is difficult “to define . . . . [b]ut I 
know it when I see it.”31 
This is not a novel position. In fact, the Anti-Federalists criticized the 
Constitution’s grant of equity power to the federal judiciary. “It is a very dangerous 
thing to vest” in a judge both legal and equitable jurisdiction, “Federal Farmer” 
argued, “for if the law restrain [sic] him, he is only to step into his shoes of equity, 
and give what judgment his reason or opinion may dictate.”32 The very reasoning 
advanced by our Constitution’s ablest opponents advises against the use of equity; 
it would license unelected “politicians in robes” to administer justice in accordance 
with personal beliefs or political whims. 
But this reasoning has some incoherence. It not only presumes that equity is 
not subject to any rules, but also that law adheres to especially strict ones. Neither 
premise is completely fair. While it is true that “[e]quity eschews mechanical rules 
[and] depends on flexibility,” the tool is by no means boundless.33 Equity, just as 
law, consists of principles and rules that dictate when and how it should be applied.34 
Certainly it requires some measure of faith to believe that judges would look to 
equity only when the law offers insufficient guidance. But if the objection is due to 
skepticism about judges’ expertise, i.e. that they lack the legal skill and judgment to 
know when to resort to equity, that is a concern about legal training, not equity. If, 
however, the objection stems from doubt about judges’ intention or willingness to 
apply the law, that doubt is no greater than what is warranted now; judges take an 
oath of office, and we already rely on them to apply the law faithfully.35 Our 
confidence in the judiciary should presume that judges understand when the 
administration of justice calls on them to “mould [a] decree to the necessities of the 
particular case,”36 and that they will show restraint and apply the rules that each case 
demands. 
                                                             
31 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
32 Letter from Federal Farmer, no. 3 (Oct. 10, 1787), in 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 244 
(Herbert J. Storing, ed., 1981). 
33 Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946) (emphasis added). 
34 See, e.g., Michael T. Morely, The Federal Equity Power, 59 B.C. L. REV. 217, 231–32 (2018) (“For 
more than a century after the Founding, federal courts treated equity as an independent body of law 
they were required to apply . . . . [that] distinguished among four types of issues relating to equity to 
which different constitutional provisions, statutory restrictions, and other doctrines applied: 
jurisdictional, procedural, remedial, and substantive.”). 
35 28 U.S.C. § 453 (requiring federal judges to swear that they “will faithfully and impartially discharge 
and perform all the duties incumbent upon [them] . . . under the Constitution and laws of the United 
States.”). 
36 Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 
321, 329 (1944)) (holding that the Federal Water Pollution Control Act did not preclude courts from 
using equity to ensure compliance with the law). 
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Nor is it necessarily the case that legal rules are more constant or rigid than 
equitable ones, a point that our anti-discrimination cases make clear. Not only has 
doctrine changed dramatically over time (as noted above), but judges are taught that 
the meaning of legal equality can be discerned through balancing tests or appeals to 
the legislators’ then-state of mind. At best, the doctrinal shifts and development of 
legal tests prove that courts grapple with difficult cases and seek to reconcile tricky 
facts and imprecise rules. But tough cases will always arise irrespective of the law 
or analytical devices used to apply it. By using equity, judges would probably show 
more—but certainly no less—fidelity to the law than those who look for it to be 
revealed through modes like “originalism,” “living constitutionalism,” and other 
theories of interpretation.37 
 
*** 
 
To illustrate equity’s potential, consider Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co.38 A female, 20-year veteran of the company filed a discrimination suit 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, alleging that her employer took adverse 
action against her over a long period of time because of her gender.39 The effects of 
the alleged conduct were stark: before taking early retirement, Ledbetter learned that 
she had been making significantly less than her male counterparts—approximately 
87% of what the lowest paid male in the same position earned when the claim was 
filed.40 
Ledbetter initiated the administrative grievance process, then filed her claim 
in court. At the trial stage, the jury found the evidence to be in her favor, and granted 
her backpay, damages, and attorneys’ costs and fees.41 The appeals court reversed. 
It held that the evidence did not prove that Goodyear acted with discriminatory intent 
during the 180-day statutory filing period before Ledbetter filed a claim, ruling that 
the case was untimely.42 In affirming the decision, the Supreme Court held that 
salary determinations—not the separate paychecks based on them—are discrete, 
litigable employment actions.43 So, despite the cumulative impact of such action, 
wage discrimination claims will lapse if not contested when employers set salaries. 
In this case, the primary obstacle to redress for the unequal treatment alleged 
was procedural—the statute of limitations. While the majority found it to be 
unsurmountable, it is not clear that a strictly legal test demanded this outcome. Not 
                                                             
37 See Saul Cornell, New Originalism: A Constitutional Scam, DISSENT MAGAZINE, May 3, 2011, 
https://www.dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/new-originalism-a-constitutional-scam 
[https://perma.cc/2JRP-KAQX]; Ilya Somin, Originalism, Living Constitutionalism, and Outrageous 
Outcomes, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2017/02/04/originalism-living-constitutionalism-and-outrageous-outcomes/ 
[https://perma.cc/FYH4-MXPM]. 
38 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007). 
39 Id. at 621–22. 
40 See id. at 643 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
41 Id. at 644. 
42 Id. at 622–23 (majority opinion). 
43 Id. at 628 (“A new violation does not occur, and a new charging period does not commence, upon 
the occurrence of subsequent nondiscriminatory acts that entail adverse effects resulting from the past 
discrimination.”). 
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only did the Supreme Court split 5-4 on the question, but the majority acknowledged 
that the case resolved “disagreement among the Courts of Appeals as to the proper 
application of the limitations period.”44 As the dissent noted, reasonable minds could 
differ on the issue based on whether they viewed “the pay-setting decision, and that 
decision alone, as the unlawful practice,” or “both the pay-setting decision and the 
actual payment of a discriminatory wage as unlawful practices.”45 At a minimum, 
this suggests that the dispute was not a simple one that could be settled through rote 
application of a legal test. 
Assume, then, that the legal equality framework is inapt or insufficient to 
discern which view “is more faithful to precedent.”46 Courts could apply an equity 
analysis—equity praeter legem given the law’s vagueness—in addressing the 
legitimate concern about timeliness. The Court would likely draw on two relevant 
doctrines: equitable tolling and laches. If “the plaintiff, despite diligent efforts, did 
not discover the injury until after the limitations period had expired,” the claim need 
not be automatically time-barred but, instead, the statutory period should be 
“suspended or tolled until the plaintiff discovers the injury.”47 If, still, the court finds 
an “[u]nreasonable delay in pursuing a right or claim . . . in a way that prejudices the 
party against whom relief is sought,” then laches would prevail, and the claim will 
have lapsed.48 
Instead of being mired in stalemate, using equity could move courts past the 
textual ambiguity to proceed with a fact-based inquiry. The test would probe whether 
Ledbetter met her “burden of establishing . . . (1) that [she] has been pursuing [her] 
rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in [the] way” 
of her vindicating them.49 For this part of the inquiry, it would be appropriate for the 
Court to consider facts relevant to “the realities of the workplace,” such as the 
company “kept salaries confidential [and] employees had only limited access to 
information regarding their colleagues’ earnings.”50 The Court could also elicit facts 
to assess whether Ledbetter’s “inaction” resulted in “legitimate reliance” by 
Goodyear or otherwise prejudiced the company, factors which “may bar long-
dormant claims.”51 The Court could determine whether Goodyear could establish a 
diminished ability to obtain witnesses due to death or faded memory, for example, 
and whether it had become too difficult or impossible to collect other evidence over 
time. Unlike judicial philosophies not rooted in the Constitution, this supplemental 
equity analysis offers a concrete basis for dealing with the law’s imprecision. While 
                                                             
44 Id. at 623. 
45 Id. at 646 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
46 Id. 
47 Equitable Tolling, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Equitable tolling does not require 
misconduct such as concealment by the defendant.”).  
48 Laches, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Notably, the dissent in Ledbetter made a passing 
reference to equity that highlighted its potential benefit for the case: “Employers disadvantaged by such 
delay may raise various defenses. Doctrines such as ‘waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling’ ‘allow us 
to honor Title VII’s remedial purpose without negating the particular purpose of the filing requirement, 
to give prompt notice to the employer.” Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 657 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal 
citations omitted). 
49 Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). 
50 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 646, 650 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
51 City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 217 (2005). 
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an Equal Rights Amendment would not necessarily have altered the majority’s 
reasoning or outcome, applying equity might have led to a more just outcome.52 
 
*** 
 
It is worth reiterating that my argument for invoking equity is not an 
argument against the Equal Rights Amendment. Quite the contrary. The principle 
underlying the ERA is wholly consistent with our constitutional values, and a default 
rule against the pernicious use of gender would provide a basis for further legal 
progress. As they were with the Fourteenth Amendment, lawmakers would be 
justified in adopting the ERA, even if it is uncertain that the amendment would fully 
achieve its advocates’ desired ends. My argument for an appeal to equity is just that, 
and it stems from a belief in equity’s potential. Equity can play an important role to 
ensure more just treatment because it can work within a system that Americans, 
despite our differences, have come to know and accept. 
                                                             
52 Because the Court affirmed the case’s dismissal on procedural grounds, it did not have to answer the 
substantive question or address relief. Importantly, the jury found that there was sex discrimination 
occurring before the 180-day period and determined the measure of damages due to her. My proposal 
would have enhanced the Ledbetter Court’s analysis, as exemplified by a separate appeal to equity by 
the dissent, which would be fully supported by an Equitable Rights Amendment. See Ledbetter, 550 
U.S. at 650–51 (“When a male employee is selected over a female for a higher level position, someone 
still gets the promotion and is paid a higher salary; the employer is not enriched. But when a woman is 
paid less than a similarly situated man, the employer reduces its costs each time the pay differential is 
implemented.”) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
